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THE HAND THAT TRULY ROCKS THE
CRADLE: A REPRISE OF INFANT CRIB
SAFETY, LAWSUITS AND REGULATION
FROM 2007-2012
Richard J. Hunter, Jr.*
And
Melissa A Montuori**
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is
charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of
injury or death associated with the use of the thousands of
consumer products under the agency’s jurisdiction. Deaths,
injuries, and property damage from consumer product incidents
cost the nation more than $900 billion annually. CPSC is
committed to protecting consumers and families from products
that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard.
CPSC’s work to ensure the safety of consumer products—such as
toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters and household
chemicals—contributed to a decline in the rate of deaths and
injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.
(Statement of purpose from the website of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (“CPSC”). 1

I. INTRODUCTION: CHILD PROTECTION AND THE CPSC

F

ew questions are as important for new parents as “where will
the baby sleep”? The infant crib is one of the biggest, most
expensive, and potentially most-researched purchases on the
shopping list for the new arrival. After all, newborns sleep an
* Professor of Legal Studies, Seton Hall University
** MBA Candidate, Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University
1
See http://wwwcpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml2/12273.html.
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average of 15-16 hours per day. 2 What could be more important
than a crib that is comfortable, attractive, and above all else,
safe? Who is or should be responsible for the safety of our
children?
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”)
is an independent agency founded in 1972 during the Nixon
administration. It is “charged with protecting the public from
unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from thousands of
types of consumer products.” 3 As one commentator noted, “The
CPSC has jurisdiction over more than 15,000 kinds of consumer
products used in and around the home, in sports, recreation and
schools.” 4 This jurisdiction was granted by the 1972 Consumer
Product Safety act (CPSA). 5 The act was passed with the goal of
protecting the public from unsafe consumer products,
standardizing the method of reporting injuries caused by
products, and conducting research targeted at making products
safer. 6 In order to carry out these aims, the act granted the CPSC
the power to investigate products that may present a hazard to
the public. 7 CPSA Section 2064(d) stipulates that 8 a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of a consumer product
distributed in the United States that receives information which
would reasonably support a conclusion that one of its products
contains a defect that could create a “substantial product
hazard” 9 or an “unreasonable risk of serious injury or death” 10
2
How Much Sleep Do Children Need?, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/guide/sleep-children (last updated Feb. 6,
2012).
3
About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2012). In creating
the CPSC, Congress acknowledged that “the complexities of consumer
products and the diverse nature and abilities of consumers using them
frequently result in an inability of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard
themselves adequately.” 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(2) (2006). The term “consumer
product” is generally considered to be synonymous with a “consumer good.”
The term “consumer goods” is generally understood to mean goods “used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” See, e.g.,
Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999).
4
Leslie Cornell, Products Liability and Internet Prevention, 24 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 254, 256 (2011).
5
Brandon D. Coneby, A “Thrilling” Proposal: Federal Regulation of
America’s Modern Day Scream Machines, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 787, 792 (2001).
6
Id. at 793.
7
Id.
8
15 U.S.C. § 2064(d) (2006).
9
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(3) (2006).

HunterArticleFinal (Do Not Delete)

2013

The Hand That Rocks the Cradle

3/11/2013 4:49 PM

231

must inform the CPSC of the existence of that defect. 11
The regulatory authority of the CPSC extends to a wide
variety of parties typically involved in modern products liability
litigation: manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and importers of
consumer products. Unlike many regulatory agencies that must
meet “threshold requirements” in terms of volume of business,
sales, number of parties involved in the manufacturing process,
etc., the CPSC maintains authority regardless of the size, number
of employees or revenue of a business handling consumer
products. 12 The CPSC as an agency bears primary responsibility
for “obtaining the recall of products or arranging for their repair,
conducting research on potential product hazards, informing and
educating consumers through the media, state and local
governments, private organizations, and by responding to
consumer inquiries.” 13
In 2008, Congress took steps to modernize the existing
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(4) (2006).
A defect may be considered to be a “fault, flaw, or irregularity that
causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy in form or function.” See 16 C.F.R. §
1115.4. The regulations define the term “substantial product hazard” as either
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule, which
failure creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or (2) a product defect
which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public. See id. § 1115.2(a). The
regulations set out an explanation of what constitutes an unreasonable risk in
Section 1115.6(b). It requires that the “firm” should examine “the utility of the
product, the utility of the aspect of the aspect of the product that causes the
risk, the level of exposure of consumers to the risk, the nature and severity of
the hazard presented, and the likelihood of resulting serious injury or death.”
Id. § 1115.6(b). “Serious injury” involves “grievous bodily injury,” which
includes “injuries necessitating hospitalization, which requires actual medical
or surgical treatment, fractures, lacerations requiring sutures, concussions,
injuries to the eye, ear, or internal organs requiring medical treatment, and
injuries necessitating absences from school or work of more than one day.” Id.
§ 1115.6(c).
12
2011-2016 U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Strategic Plan,
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N 3 (2011) [hereinafter STRATEGIC
PLAN],
available
at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports
/2011strategic.pdf.
13
Cornell, supra note 4, at 257 (citing STRATEGIC PLAN, at 3). In
addition, the CPSC is charged with administering several additional laws,
dealing with specific areas of consumer product safety: Flammable Fabrics
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1953); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15
U.S.C. 1261−1278 (1960); Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1471−1477 (1970); Children’s Gasoline Burn Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 110278, 122 Stat. 2602 (2008); and the Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8001-8008 (2008).
10
11
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regulatory framework of the CPSC by enacting the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act (“CPSIA”). 14 Reflecting a major
change in technology and in the way that Americans (and others)
receive and disseminate information relating to consumer
products, the CPSIA created an “online, publicly available, and
searchable database of product-related injuries. Congress created
this online consumer database to promote a more preventative
approach to consumer safety, wherein consumers could gather
near-immediate alerts to dangerous products and risks of harm.” 15
This new online database was launched in March of 2011,
pursuant to the deadline set by Congress in the CPSIA. 16
The CPSIA, which became law on August 14, 2008, grants
the CPSC the authority to require the manufacturer, distributor,
or retailer of a consumer product that poses a “substantial
product hazard” 17 to provide public notice of such hazard and to
repair or replace the product, or offer a refund of the purchase
price of the product. 18 The CPSIA grants the CPSC the authority
to recall products that fail to comply with other rules and
regulations, standards, or product bans that the CPSC chooses to
enforce under other statutes or administrative regulations. The
CPSC can also order the corrective actions of a recall or the
“submission of a corrective action plan covering all brands of the
product that have the same design and manufacturing process”
for a product that contains a defect that creates a “substantial
product hazard” or an “unreasonable risk.” 19 Importantly, the
CPSC may also require repair or refund, thus removing the
choice of remedy from a manufacturer. The CPSC has the
authority to withdraw approval of corrective action plans it
deems ineffective and to order amendments to any corrective
plans when recalls do take place. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly from the standpoint of the consumer, the CPSIA

14
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110314, 122 Stat. 3016 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2089).
15
Cornell, supra note 4, at 255 (emphasis added) (citing Lyndsey Layton,
Consumer Product Safety Commission to launch public database of complaints,
WASH.
POST,
Jan.
10,
2011,
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/09/AR2011010902730.html).
16
For specific information concerning the online database, see Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 2055a (2006).
17
See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d)(1)-(3) (2006).
18
See 15 U.S.C. 2064 (2006).
19
See TERRENCE F. KIELY & BRUCE L. OTTLEY, UNDERSTANDING
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 210 (LexisNexis 2006).
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prohibits the sale and export of recalled products. 20 On the
importance of these key regulatory changes, one commentator
notes that, “While the vast majority of recalls have been, and will
continue to be, ‘voluntary’ the CPSC, under the CPSIA, is in a
stronger position to carry out negotiations concerning corrective
action plans.” 21
It should be noted, however, that the CPSC does not
independently test or certify products before they reach the
consumer because it lacks the legal authority to do so. Moreover,
the jurisdiction of the agency is limited. It does not have
jurisdiction over products such as automobiles and other on-road
vehicles, tires, boats, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, food, drugs,
cosmetics, pesticides, and medical devices, which are all
controlled by other federal regulatory agencies—most notably the
Food and Drug Administration or the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. 22

II. THE ISSUE DEFINED
From 1978 to 2012, the CPSC recorded more than 100 crib
recalls and product warnings. More than half were issued
between 2007-2012. 23 Defects in infant cribs have varied from
detaching or badly-spaced slats, to issues relating to paints and
finishes that contain harmful substances (such as lead). There
have also been problems with mattress supports and hardware
used on cribs. One of the most recent and highly publicized
controversies concerned detaching drop-sides on cribs.24
The following factual and statistical information is
15 U.S.C. 2064 (2006).
Cornell, supra note 4, at 261.
22
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited August 17, 2012). For a
general discussion of issues surrounding regulation in the U.S. economy, see
Richard J. Hunter, Jr., John H. Shannon, Susan O’Sullivan-Gavin & Mark S.
Blodgett, Regulation: A Historical Perspective and Discussion of the Impact of
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment and the Move to
Deregulate the American Economy,” 32 U. LAVERNE L. REV. 137 (2011).
23
Crib Information Center, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/cgi-bin/cribs.aspx (last accessed August 15, 2012).
24
For a proper framing of the debate, see Cheryl A. Falvel et al.,
Proposed Standards for Full-Size and Non-Full-Size Cribs under Section 104
of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act and Related Documents,
U.S.
CONSUMER
PROD.
SAFETY
COMM’N
(June
30,
2010),
http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia10/brief/104cribs.pdf.
20
21
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abstracted from a Report issued by the CPSC in 2010, titled
“Full-Size Baby Cribs and Non-Full-Size Baby Cribs: Safety
Standards.” 25 The CPSC reported that a full-size crib has specific
interior dimensions of approximately 28 +/- 5⁄8 inches (71 +/- 1.6
centimeters) in width and 523⁄8 +/- 5/8 inches (133 +/- 1.6
centimeters) in length and is designed to provide sleeping
accommodations for an infant. CPSC staff estimated that there
were 68 manufacturers or importers supplying full-size cribs to
the U.S. market. Ten of these firms were domestic importers (15
percent); 42 were domestic manufacturers (62 percent); 7 were
foreign manufacturers (10 percent); and 2 were foreign importers
(3 percent). The Commission reported that insufficient
information was available about the remaining firms to
categorize them.
Based on information from a 2005 survey conducted by
the American Baby Group, referenced in the Report, CPSC staff
estimated that annual sales of new cribs amounted to about 2.4
million units, of which approximately 2.1 million were full-size
cribs. CPSC staff further estimated that there were
approximately 591 models of full-size cribs compared to
approximately 81 models of non-full-size cribs. Thus,
approximately 88 percent of crib models surveyed were full-size
cribs. 26
In contrast, a non-full-size crib may be either smaller or
larger than a full-size crib, or shaped differently than the usual
rectangular crib. The category of non-full-size cribs includes what
are termed as oversized, specialty, drop-side, undersized, and
portable cribs, but does not include any product with
mesh/net/screen siding, non-rigidly constructed cribs, cradles, car
beds, baby baskets, or bassinets. The CPSC standard for nonfull-size cribs also did not apply to play yards, which are mesh or
fabric-sided products. CPSC staff estimated that there are
currently at least 17 manufacturers or importers supplying nonfull-size cribs to the U.S. market. Five of these firms were
domestic importers and 10 were domestic manufacturers. As in
the case of full-sized cribs, the Commission reported that
insufficient information was available to determine whether the

SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FULL-SIZE BABY CRIBS AND NON-FULLSIZE BABY CRIBS; FINAL RULE, 75 Fed. Reg. 81766-01, (Dec. 28, 2010) (citing
crib dimensions, numbers of manufacturers (by countries of origin), and total
numbers of cribs sold in the U.S. domestic market).
26
Id.
25
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remaining firms are manufacturers or importers. In the aggregate,
CPSC staff estimated that of the approximately 2.4 million cribs
sold to households annually, approximately 293,000 were non-fullsize cribs. 27
The drop-side crib, originally designed for “mom
convenience,” is meant to enable the parent to lower the side of
the crib and more easily lift out the baby. 28 This convenience,
however, came at a price. Broken hinges could leave gaps
between the bed and side large enough to trap an infant,
potentially causing injuries or even strangulation. 29 Drop-side
cribs have been manufactured for several generations, but due to
changes in design, materials, manufacturing protocols, and
incidents with this style of crib have escalated in recent years. As
a result, CPSC issued a ban on the sale of drop-side cribs as part
of sweeping new standards for infant cribs, which were
announced in December 2010. 30
A. Fast-Forward to 2010
In a statement issued on December 15, 2010, Inez
Tenenbaum, current Chairman of the CPSC, cited 35 infant
deaths since November 2007, which occurred when “crib
components detached, disengaged, or broke, ending in
unspeakable tragedy.” 31 Following this determination, on
December 28, 2010, the CPSC issued “Full-Size Baby Cribs and
Non-Full-Size Baby Cribs: Safety Standards; Revocation of
Requirements; Third Party Testing for Certain Children’s

Id.
Meredith Melnick, U.S. Sets Rigorous New Safety Standards for Cribs,
TIME (June 28, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/2011/06/28/u-s-sets-rigorousnew-safety-standards-for-all-cribs/.
29
Id.
30
See Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, CPSC
Approves Strong New Crib Safety Standards to Ensure a Safe Sleep for Babies
and
Toddlers
(Dec.
17,
2010),
available
at
www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml11/11074.html.
31
Statement of Chairman Inez M. Tenenbaum on the Commission
Decision Regarding The Final Rule on the Mandatory Safety Standards For
Full Size and Non-Full Size Cribs, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/tenenbaum12152010.pdf.
Record of Commission Action and Commission Meeting Minutes FY 2010,
U.S.
CONSUMER
PROD.
SAFETY
COMM’N,
www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/ballot/ballot10/ballot10.html (last accessed January
15, 2013).
27
28
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Products; Final Rules,” which laid out the new regulations. 32
These rules cited 147 fatalities between November 1, 2007, and
April 1, 2010. The rules outlawed the drop-side variety of cribs
and set more stringent manufacturing and testing guidelines.
The regulations also provided for penalties for non-compliance
relating to infant cribs of all sizes. 33
A notable and unprecedented aspect of the 2010
regulations was an expansion of the ground-breaking Consumer
Products Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) of 2008. 34 This
expansion was specifically targeted at children’s products. The
2010 regulations required compliance not only by manufacturers
and retailers, who were required to stop selling non-compliant
cribs by June 28, 2011, but also by ‘places of public
accommodation,’ including child care facilities, hotels, etc., which
were required to replace non-compliant cribs by December 28,
2012. 35
What particular defects in drop-down cribs led to these
regulations? What was the nature of lawsuits filed in the years
leading up to them? How did the various lawsuits impact upon
these policy changes? The history of infant crib regulation is a
primer on the application and development of strict liability in
tort law: 36legal actions have been undertaken alleging
SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FULL-SIZE BABY CRIBS AND NON-FULL-SIZE
BABY CRIBS; FINAL RULE, 75 Fed. Reg. 81766-01, (Dec. 28, 2010).
33
Id.
34
15 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2006) (effective August 12, 2011).
35
Inez M. Tenenbaum, Statement of Chairman Inez M. Tenenbaum on
the Vote to Reaffirm the Retailer Compliance Date for the New Mandatory
Standards for Full-Size and Non-Full-Size Cribs and to Grant Additional
Time for Compliance with Those Standards to Companies who Provide ShortTerm Crib Rentals, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (June 16, 2012),
http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/tenenbaum06162011.pdf.
36
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal.
1963) (“A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Although in these cases
strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied
warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of
the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is
not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort”). After Greenman,
the American Law Institute promulgated section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which makes sellers of defective products strictly liable as if
32
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manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing defects, 37 as
well as a class action lawsuit 38 brought by crib owners seeking
they were manufacturers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
37
For a discussion of the sources of product defects in products liability
cases, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Henry J. Amoroso & John H. Shannon, A
Managerial Guide to Products Liability: A Primer on the Law in the United
States, 2 INT’L J. LEARNING & DEV. 34 (2012) available at
http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijld/article/view/1773.
38
Concerning the issues relating to class action lawsuits against
manufacturing-defendants, see generally Sofia Adrogue & Hon. Caroline
Baker, Litigation in the 21st Century: The Jury Trial, the Training & the
Experts Musings & Teachings from David J. Beck, Lisa Blue, Melanie Gray &
Stephen D. Susman, 56 THE ADVOCATE 8 (2001) available at
http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate_Vol56_Fall2011.pdf.
One of the presenters, Lisa Blue, writes: Corporations also seek to increase the
difficulty in bringing class action lawsuits as another tool to strong-arm
individual litigants. For example, although aimed at reducing class action
lawsuit abuse, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 harms individuals with
legitimate claims due to the increased difficulty in bringing class action
lawsuits. This act makes it too difficult and expensive for a consumer to bring
a class action lawsuit; thus, it is more difficult to hold the corporate giant in
check. Class action suits are invaluable because they afford consumers the
opportunity to bring collective claims against large corporations that would
otherwise be too small to bring separately. Absent the deterrent effect of class
action litigation, corporations can profit at the expense of vulnerable
consumers. Id. at 12 (providing a critique of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005). For a discussion of the history of class action suits in products liability
litigation, see Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Exporting United
States Tort Law: The Importance of Authenticity, Necessity, and Learning
from our Mistakes, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 571 (2011). Concerning the issue of
certification in products liability cases, see Jenna G. Farleigh, Splitting the
Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1610
(2011): “Given these outcomes, the appellate courts suggest that products
liability cases resist issue class certification of specific elements of liability,
regardless of what those elements might be. The district courts therefore
reasonably hesitate to grant issue class certification in products liability cases
on any element of liability.” (citing Kemp v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., No. 00-3513,
2004 WL 2095618, at 6 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2004); Neely v. Ethicon Inc., No.
1:00-CV-00569, 1:01-CV-37, 1:01-CV-38, 2001 WL 1090204, at 14-15 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 15, 2001)). See Christopher Keleher, Class Inaction: U.S. Supreme
Court Reins in Class Actionsactions, RES GESTAE, May, 2012 at 22 (citing
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
23(A))
available
at
http://www.querrey.com/assets/attachments/355.pdf. See also Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) (noting that “District courts must be
especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance
settlements” and that “they have broad power and discretion vested in them by
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23 with respect to matters involving the certification and
management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions”).
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monetary damages once cribs were deemed unfit for use. It is
interesting to note that it is difficult to find resolutions in the
public record for many of the publicized lawsuits. Presumably,
most of these were settled privately, out of court. 39 It appears that
American manufacturers are smart enough to realize it would be
nearly impossible to prevail against parents who have lost an
infant, arguably the most heartbreaking loss of all, in the “court
of public opinion.”

39
For a discussion of the issue of secrecy in settlement of product liability
cases, see Katherine Sullivan, Letting the Sunshine in: Ethical Implications of
the Sunshine in Litigation Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923 (2010). The
author noted “A host of legislation has been introduced to curb what is
increasingly seen as an abuse of confidentiality by the courts.” Id. at 923. As an
example, in 1990, the State of Florida enacted the Sunshine in Litigation Act,
which prohibits a court from entering an order that has the “effect of
concealing a public hazard,” and voids “any portion of an agreement or
contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard.” FLA.
STAT. § 69.081 (2009). States such as Louisiana, South Carolina, Washington,
and Texas have adopted similar anti-secrecy laws. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 1426(C) (2009); S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1(c); WASH. REV. CODE §
4.24.611(2) (2009); TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. Representative Robert Wexler (D-Fla.)
and Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) introduced the federal Sunshine in Litigation
Act of 2009. The legislation would have limited the issuance of protective
orders and the sealing of cases to two specific instances: first, where the order
would not restrict the disclosure of information relevant to the protection of
public health or safety; second, where the public interest in the disclosure of
health or safety hazards is outweighed by a substantial interest in keeping the
information private. In addition, the requested protective order must be “no
broader than necessary to protect the privacy interest asserted.” See Sunshine
in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. (2009) (House Bill); Sunshine
in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009) (Senate Bill). Sullivan cites
the settlements over products like Firestone tires, the Dalkon Shield, and drugs
like Halcion and Prozac. Sullivan, infra, at 923. As to Firestone, see Keith
Bradsher, S.U.V Tire Defects were Known in ‘96 but not Reported, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/24/business/suv-tiredefects-were-known-in-96-but-not-reported.html (discussing Firestone tire
cases in which attorneys did not disclose an identified pattern of tire failure for
fear that private lawsuits would be compromised); as to Dalkon Shield, see
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD 246 (Pantheon Books 1985) (describing the tactics used by
A.H. Robins for over ten years to conceal defects in its intra-uterine devices);
as to issues relating to drugs, see RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD,
THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE,
POWER, AND GREED 187 (Random House 1999) (“The makers of the
prescription drugs Zomax, Halcion, and Prozac all experienced problems with
their products, and all took great pains to keep their settlements secret”).
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III. A BRIEF REPRISE OF LITIGATION
It has not always been the case that courts were responsive
to complaints by consumers. In a case that arose nearly a quartercentury ago in 1988, Odom v. Welsh Co., 40 the plaintiff, Donna
Odom, brought a wrongful death suit on behalf of her deceased
infant son, Yan Christopher, who was asphyxiated when his neck
was caught between the crib’s headboard and an unsecured slide
rail. The plaintiff alleged that her son’s death had been caused by
a defective screw assembly in the crib—a defect in the overall
design of the crib, 41 which was not “random and atypical,” but
one, which would affect all models of its kind. At trial, Donna
Odom testified that when she put the infant to bed the evening
before his death, she had not noticed anything unusual about the
crib. Following the child’s death, police investigators found the
screw intended to bolt the metal slide rod to the crib headboard
under a cot in the infant’s room. The grommet nut intended to
secure the screw in place was found under numerous items piled
in a closet in the infant’s room. The drop side of the crib was
turned toward the wall; the crib was positioned approximately a
foot from the wall. A rattle device was strung from both sides of
the crib. The defendant claimed that the rattle device served to
secure the side rail in place in the absence of the screw unit. On
the evidence presented at trial, the jury found in favor of the
defendant. It determined that the crib was reasonably safe for its
intended use, i.e., nothing was wrong with the screw assembly.
Further, because of the change made by Yan Christopher’s
mother in stringing the rattle device, the jury determined that the
Odom crib was not being used in a reasonably foreseeable
manner. It was apparent that the manufacturer had been able to
convince the jury that a rattle device strung from the sides of the
40

Odom v. Welsh Co., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4546 (8th Dist. Nov. 10,

1988).
See Odom, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4546, at *11-12.
In determining whether a product design is in a defective condition, a
single, two-pronged test should be used: under the consumer expectation
standard prong, a defendant will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves
that the product design is in a defective condition because the product fails to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; under the risk-benefit standard
prong, a defendant will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves, by using
relevant criteria, that the product design is in a defective condition because the
benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risks inherent in such
design.” (citing Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1982)).
41
41
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crib had been used to hold the crib together by providing expert
testimony 42 about the safety and testing of the screw assembly to
prove the design of the crib was sound.
Nearly twenty years later, Connie Bergey of Palm Beach,
Florida filed a similar wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of her
daughter, Serenity, against (then-defunct) Simplicity Inc. and its
successor corporation, 43 the SFCA, and Walmart. This litigation
ended differently. In September 2007, two-year-old Serenity was
asphyxiated when her head became caught in the frame of her
Simplicity crib. Two days after her death, the crib model in
which she had been sleeping was one of over one million cribs
recalled by Simplicity, 44 raising the issue whether there might
The requirement of expert testimony implicates what is called the
Daubert Rule and entails a judge to act in a “gatekeeping role” to assure that
any alleged expert testimony meets a basic threshold based on real and not
junk science. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993). The factors described in Daubert include: Whether a “theory or
technique . . .can be (and has been) tested”; whether it “has been subjected to
peer review and publication”; whether, in respect to a particular technique,
there is a high “known or potential rate of error” and whether there are
“standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and whether the theory or
technique enjoys “general acceptance” within a “relevant scientific
community.” See Kumho Tire. Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149
(1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592-594 (1993)). The Supreme Court in
Kumho Tire also noted that the Daubert Rule would apply to all expert
testimony—not just to evidence that is scientifically based (noting that “the
language makes no relevant distinction between “scientific” knowledge and
“technical” or “other specialized” knowledge”; making clear that “any such
knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony”; stating that “the
Rule applies its reliability standard to all “scientific,” “technical,” or “other
specialized” matters within its scope”; and conceding that “the Court in
Daubert referred only to “scientific” knowledge”). Id. at 147 (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589-90). The Kumho court further stated that the Court in Daubert
referred to “scientific” testimony not as a limiting factor but “because that
[wa]s the nature of the expertise” at issue. Id. at 148 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 590 n.8).
43
A corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation is liable
for harm caused by defective products sold by the predecessor corporation
under “certain circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 12 (1997). For a discussion of issues surrounding successor
corporation liability and outlining several of these circumstances, see Richard
J. Hunter, Jr., Henry J. Amoroso & John H. Shannon, A Primer on the Law in
the United States: Part III Scope of Liability in Products Liability Cases, 2
INT’L J. LEARNING & DEV. 1, 9-10 (2012), available at
http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijld/article/view/2049.
44
Baby Crib Wrongful Death Lawsuit Filed over Defect Design,
ABOUTLAWSUITS (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.aboutlawsuits.com/baby-crib42
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have been a problem with the design of the crib. Bergey
eventually settled out of court for an undisclosed amount. 45
The case of Carter Michael Pack also focused on alleged
design defects in the crib. In Pack v. Stork Craft Manufacturing,
Inc., filed on June 12, 2008, 46 Jessica and Michael Pack filed a
wrongful death suit on behalf of their son Carter, who was found
asphyxiated on January 16, 2007, with his face pressed against
the crib’s mattress between the railing and the crib. The Packs
alleged that the death of their son was caused by a design defect
involving screws that were in violation of CPSC regulations, and
sought compensatory and punitive damages. 47 The plaintiffs
claimed they “suffered sorrow; mental anguish; solace to include
society, companionship, comfort, guidance in the kindly offices
and advice of the decedent; loss of income of the decedent;
services, protection, care and assistance provided by the
decedent; and funeral expenses.” 48
As in similar cases involving drop-down cribs, no
information was readily available on the public record relating to
any settlement in the case. However, the case was believed to
have led to one of the largest ever crib recalls, 49 in which 2.1
million Stork Craft cribs were recalled for the same or similar
design defect. 50 Many of the alleged problems that led to the
massive crib recalls were originally thought to be the result of a
wrongful-death-lawsuit-filed-5937.
45
Brian Haas, West Boca woman settles suit against crib maker,
Walmart, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 12, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/201003-12/news/fl-crib-death-settlement-20100312_1_drop-rail-crib-makerserenity.
46
See Cara Bailey, Fayette Couple Sues Cribmaker over Son’s Death,
W.WEST
VA.
RECORD
(July
23,
2008
at
10:00
AM),
http://www.wvrecord.com/news/213832-fayette-couple-sues-cribmaker-oversons-death. The case may be accessed from the records of the Kanawah Circuit
Court at 08-C-1149.
47
For a general discussion of issues relating to damages in product
liability suits, see Henry J. Amoroso & Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Damages for
Pain and Suffering and Emotional Distress in Products Liability Cases
Involving Strict Liability and Negligence, 3 FAULKNER L. REV. 277 (2012).
48
Christopher Dickerson, Local Lawsuit Helped Spur Crib Recall, W. VA.
RECORD (Nov. 25, 2009 at 8:52 AM), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/223316local-lawsuit-helped-spur-crib-recall.
49
Id.
50
See Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Infant
Entrapment and Suffocation Prompts Stork Craft to Recall more than 2.1
Million
Drop-Side
Cribs
(Nov.
23,
2009),
available
at
www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml10/10046.html.
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manufacturing defect — defined as a random, atypical
breakdowns in the manufacturing process.51 How did the various
manufacturers attempt to deal with these issues?
What is known is that the manufacturer often recalled the
products, offering a retrofit kit that consumers could use to repair
the crib, rather than the option of a full refund. However, Amber
Spitzer, whose daughter had been sleeping in a crib that fell into
this category (but thankfully was not harmed), was not willing to
accept those terms. She became the lead plaintiff in a 2007 class
action lawsuit against Target Corp. and Simplicity. Her lawyer,
Charles Kelly, alleged that that the “recall (of 1 million Simplicity
cribs for a repair kit) is grossly inadequate and irresponsible.
Simplicity should be required to tell consumers to dismantle their
crib, and return it for a full refund.” 52 The same lawsuit also
alleged a marketing defect — or failure to warn consumers of the
potential dangers of the Simplicity cribs that had cost three
children their lives, trapping seven others, and injuring 55 more.
Attorney Kelly also represented the Johns family of Citrus
Heights, California, whose nine-month-old son Liam had died in
April 2005 when he became trapped between a detached rail and

51
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. App.
1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986) in which the
court stated: “[m]anufacturing defect cases involve products which are flawed,
i.e., which do not conform to the manufacturer’s own specifications, and are
not identical to their mass-produced siblings.” In contrast, and perhaps more
appropriate in “crib cases,” the cause of an injury may be a “design defect.” In
a case involving a design defect, the plaintiff must show that “the design [of a
product] resulted in a product that was unreasonably dangerous by using
[either the] consumer expectation test and/or the risk-utility analysis.” KIELY &
OTTLEY, supra note 19, at 134. In most cases, this determination whether or
not a plaintiff has met its evidentiary requirement (burden of proof) is a
question of fact for a jury. See Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 637
N.E.2d 1020 (Ill. 1994); Cole v. Lantis Corp., 714 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). Pennsylvania makes a policy determination that it is for a judge, not the
jury, to determine whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. See
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978) (requiring a court
to balance the risks and benefits of a design choice by a manufacturer before
permitting argument that product was unreasonably dangerous to proceed to
the jury). It appears that “no other state has adopted the Azzarello approach.”
KIELY & OTTLEY, supra note 19, at 134 n.67.
52
Maurice Possley, Lawsuit Filed Against Crib Manufacturersfiled
against crib manufacturers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 2007),
www.chicagotribune.com/services/newspaper/eedition/chicrib_websep25,0,5172048.story.
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the side of the crib,53 another case that was likely settled out of
court in favor of the plaintiffs.
A. Other Potential Plaintiffs and Theories of Recovery
Since a crib can be a major investment for many parents,
some whose children have not necessarily suffered any physical
injury or death, have claimed monetary damages citing “financial
injury.” One plaintiff group, O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., filed a
class action lawsuit, alleging that the plaintiffs had not received
the full “benefit of the bargain” for the drop-side cribs they had
purchased, as they were no longer safe to use, and that the retrofit
kit offered in this case, which would disable the drop side, caused
an economic injury to the buyers.54 The lawsuit, which was
combined with the case filed by Amber Spitzer, was dismissed on
the grounds that because the plaintiffs’ cribs did not actually
display a defect, they had, in fact, received the benefit of the
bargain. The court stated: “Simply put, the O’Neil’s bargained
for a crib with a functioning drop side, and that is precisely what
they received.” 55 The court continued: “The O’Neil’s benefit-ofthe-bargain damages theory, therefore, does not aid their cause.
And, having failed to allege any cognizable damages, their claims

Maurice Possley, Missteps delayed recall of deadly cribs, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Sept. 24, 2007), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-0924/business/chi-070922cribs-story_1_simplicity-cribs-liam-johns-full-sizecribs/2.
54
O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Minn. 2008) The
procedural history of the case is interesting. On September 24, 2007, Amber
Spitzer, a resident of Illinois, filed a class action complaint against Simplicity,
Graco, and Target in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota. In November 2007, Spitzer withdrew the complaint and filed a
first amended complaint. Simplicity and Target filed a motion to dismiss, after
which Spitzer withdrew her pleading and voluntarily dismissed Target as a
defendant without prejudice. On January 30, 2008, the district court granted
Spitzer’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. This pleading
replaced Spitzer with the O’Neil’s as named plaintiffs. O’Neil, 553 F. Supp. 2d
at 1111-12. Later, the court would label this procedural history as taking “three
bites [of] the pleading apple” in ultimately dismissing the lawsuit with
prejudice. Id. at 1119-1120 (stating that “the Court believes that there have
been “ample opportunities to research and plead” sufficient claims here”).
55
Id. at 1118 (noting “[A] plaintiff who purchases a [crib] that never
malfunctions over its ordinary period of use cannot be said to have received
less than what he bargained for when he made the purchase”) (citing In re
Canon Cameras Litig., 237 F.R.D. 357, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
53
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falter.” 56
Other cases were based on alleged marketing defects —
failure on the part of the manufacturers and/or retailers to warn
about defects in the cribs and to instruct parents on the proper
use of infant cribs. 57 A wrongful death lawsuit was filed against
Simplicity, SFCA, and retailer Hayneedle Inc. in Boston in
January 2011 by the parents of one-year-old Landon
Zimmerman. Landon was asphyxiated on January 30, 2008,
when he became trapped between his Simplicity crib’s frame and
mattress. The suit alleged that Hayneedle had been grossly
negligent for failing to warn Landon’s parents, Laura
Zimmerman and Jeremy Fontaine, concerning the crib’s
“dangerous and defective characteristics, and of the safe and
proper method of assembling, using and maintaining (it).” 58 The
presence of the word “assembling” is a reminder that many
parents will undertake the assembly of home-use cribs as a “do-itId.
Even if a product meets the manufacturing and design requirements, a
product may still be “unreasonably dangerous” if the manufacturer fails to
adequately warn or to provide warnings about the dangers posed by a product
or if the manufacturer fails to provide adequate instructions about the safe use
of a product. See, e.g., Donohue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008
(8th8th Cir. 1989). Courts in the United States “often use the term ‘failure to
warn’ to include both the failure to provide adequate warnings about the
dangers of a product and the failure to supply adequate instructions about a
products use.” KIELY & OTTLEY, supra note 19, at 180 (citing Delaney v. Deere
and Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000)). The duty to warn is most often applied to
the manufacturer of a product. See Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395
N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986). The case of First Nat’l Bank in Albuquerque v. NorAm Agric. Prod, Inc. . .provides an excellent summary of the requirements of
an adequate warning. They include: A warning must indicate adequately the
scope of the danger; A warning must communicate reasonably the extent or
seriousness of the harm that could result from the danger; The physical aspects
of the warning, including conspicuousness, prominence, relative size of the
print, must be adequate to alert a “reasonably prudent person” to the danger; a
simple, direct warning, such as “Do not use. . .” may be adequate; and the
means to convey the warning must be adequate. See First Nat’l Bank in
Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prod., Inc., 537 P.2d 682, 691-92 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1975). See also Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962)
(holding that a manufacturer must also be expected to anticipate the
environment which is normal for the use of his product and where the
environment is the home, the manufacturer must anticipate the reasonably
foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment).
58
Donna Goodison, ‘Deadliest’ Crib Sellers Sued, BOSTON HERALD (Jan.
7,
2011),
http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view/
20110107deadliest_crib_seller_sued_family_says_it_was_never_warned/.
56
57
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yourself” project, and that the directions can be confusing or
misleading — leading to a potentially dangerous situation — and
thus to an allegation of a marketing defect. 59
Although Simplicity was one of the most high-profile
manufacturers involved in recalls and in the tragic deaths of
infants (ultimately leading to the company’s demise), dozens of
other manufacturers including LaJobi, Graco, Babi Italia,
Evenflo, Delta, Pottery Barn Kids, Ethan Allen, Bassettbaby,
Land of Nod, and many more, all followed Simplicity’s lead
between 2007 and 2011 and recalled drop-side cribs. One
manufacturer, Sorelle/C&T International, in a letter that is still
on the Internet today, assured its customers after the first round
of recalls in 2009 that “none of the cribs that have been produced
by Sorelle/C&T International have been recalled, nor were they
part of the recent recall of drop-side cribs” 60 — only to issue a

Questions relating to assembly may be seen within the larger context of
“forseeability” of how the product will be used, or in this case, assembled by
parents or others. See Smith v. Cent. Mining Equip. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89036, at *16 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2012) (noting that “The most
important consideration in determining whether a defendant owes a duty of
care is the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff” (citing Lowery v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., 160 P.3d 959, 964 (Okla. 2007))). See also, e.g., Tomkins v. Log
Sys., Inc., 385 S.E.2d 545, 547546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (“plaintiff alleged that
defendant was negligent in connection with the manufacture and sale of the
log home kit in that defendant failed to (1) use reasonable care in selecting a
design safe for the use for which it was intended; (2) make reasonable tests and
inspections of the prepackaged home to discover latent hazards involved in the
use of the product; and (3) provide adequate instructions for erection of the
home, given the defendant’s representation that the log home could be built as
a “do-it-yourself” project”). The basis for liability may be found in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 388 (1965): One who supplies
directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use, is subject to
liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the
consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that
the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied; (b)
has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition; and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to
be dangerous. See also Vogt v. S.M. Byrne Constr., Co., 115 N.W.2d 485, 486
(Wis. 1962).
60
For a discussion of the Sorelle/C&T recall, see Warning Letter from
Sorelle Furniture/C&T International (Jan. 1, 2010) available at
http://www.sorellefurniture.com/warning_letter.php.
59
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recall of 170,000 cribs on May 6, 2010. 61 The CPCS subsequently
reported that Sorelle had itself documented reports of “104
incidents of drop-side and slat detachments.” 62Sorelle/C&T
offered nothing but a repair kit for all but four older models, for
which Sorelle provided a $100 credit toward the purchase of a
new crib. 63

IV. THERE IS SOME “GOOD NEWS”
The good news is that since 2011, no manufacturer has
been allowed to make a traditional drop-side crib, and no retailer
or consumer has been allowed to sell one, even second hand — or
even give one away. 64 As noted by the CPSC Blogger, “Beginning
June 28, 2011, all cribs manufactured and sold (including resale)
must comply with new and improved federal safety standards.
The new rules, which apply to full-size and non full-size cribs,
prohibit the manufacture or sale of traditional drop-side rail
cribs, strengthen crib slats and mattress supports, improve the
quality of hardware and require more rigorous testing.” 65
This good news, however, is tempered by the fact that
thousands of hotels and child care centers were given a six month
period to replace the defective, dangerous cribs, with the
See Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, C&T
International/Sorelle Recalls Cribs due to Strangulation and Suffocation
Hazards
(May
6,
2010)
available
at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml10/10222.html.
62
Id.
63
The first author’s son slept in a Sorelle/C&T drop-side crib beginning in
September of 2002—three years before the earliest cases reported in the data
base. In January of 2003, the crib’s drop-side mechanism malfunctioned and
detached, prompting calls to the manufacturer, the retailer, the CPSC, and the
authors of the book “Baby Bargains,” which had recommended the crib. A
home visit was conducted by a CPSC representative to inspect the crib in
January of 2003, and C&T provided a repair kit, but the author chose to
immobilize the drop side instead for safety. The CPSC inspector noted that he
had seen a number of these problems with drop-side cribs. Since no one was
injured, however, the case was just a note in the record and potentially one of
the 104 “incidents” cited by C&T/Sorelle.
64
SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FULL-SIZE BABY CRIBS AND NON-FULLSIZE BABY CRIBS, 75 Fed. Reg. 81766-01 (Dec. 28, 2010).
65
See CPSC Blogger, Updated: The New Crib Standard: Questions and
Answers, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (June 14, 2011),
http://www.cpsc.gov/onsafety/2011/06/the-new-crib-standard-questions-andanswers/.
61
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generous December 28, 2012, deadline established. Recalls aimed
at consumers who still have the dangerous models in their homes
will continue, even a year after the new regulations outlawing
drop-side cribs, with the latest one on CPSC’s list in April 2012, 66
though the CPSC cannot force consumers who have the defective
cribs to stop using them. This will continue to be an issue
essentially of parental responsibility and no doubt, a point of
contention and perhaps future litigation.
Despite the lingering problems, it is encouraging from a
policy perspective that the CPSC has taken such a strong stand in
making sure that manufacturers, retailers and private and public
consumers are doing everything they can to protect the smallest,
most helpless end users in our society. It should be noted,
however, that the CPSC did not issue a simple ban on the sale of
all drop-side rail cribs. Why wasn’t a simple ban enacted? The
CPSC commented: “[T]hese are sweeping new safety rules that
will bring a safer generation of cribs to the marketplace in 2011.
CPSC’s new crib standards address many factors related to crib
safety in addition to the drop-side rail. A crib’s mattress support,
slats, and hardware are now required to be more durable and
manufacturers will have to test to the new, more stringent
requirements to prove compliance.” 67 One question yet remains:
Will this be enough?

Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Nan Far
Woodworking Recalls to Repair Drop-Side Cribs due to Entrapment,
Suffocation and Fall Hazards; Sold Exclusively at jcpenney (April 12 2012),
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml12/12148.html.
67
CPSC Blogger, supra note 65.
66

